威慑理论

在冷战时期，在使用核武器方面的威慑理论作为一种军事战略获得了越来越多的重视。在这段期间里，它具有独特的意义，因为一个相对弱的（拥核）力量可以凭借其极端的破坏力量阻止另一个更强大的对手，只要其能够在第一波突发袭击中幸存下来。威慑是一种策略，旨在吓阻其对手采取尚未开始的行动，或阻止他们做出其他国家期望的事情。伯纳德·布罗迪（英语：Bernard Brodie (military strategist)）在1959年写到，可靠的核威慑力量必须始终处于准备使用的状态，但不能已经被使用。^[1]

在托马斯·克罗姆比·谢林于1966年的经典威慑著作中，提出了军事战略不再被定义为军事胜利学的概念。相反，有人认为，军事战略现在同样强调威胁和威慑，即使不是全部，也占其大部分。^[2]谢林阐释，伤害另一个国家的能力现在被用作防止其作出某种行为的一种因素。为了达到威慑另一个国家的效果，其本国军事力量必须非常强大。因此，可以总结出，以武力为基础的讨价还价的能力是威慑理论的基础，而且在对其予以保留使用的时候是最有效的。^[2]

2004年，弗兰克·C·扎加雷提出威慑理论在逻辑上不一致，在经验上不可靠，而且作为理论而言有明显不足。理性选择学者主张以完美威慑取代传统威慑，即假设各国的内部特性可能有所不同，特别是威胁报复的可信度。^[3]

在2007年1月《华尔街日报》的一篇文章中，资深冷战决策者亨利·基辛格、比尔·佩里（英语：William Perry）、乔治·舒尔茨和山姆·纳恩（英语：Sam Nunn）扭转了他们以前的立场，并声称这远不能让世界更安全，核武器已成为极端风险的因素。^[4]他们的理论基础和结论并不是建立在只有少数国家拥有核武器的旧世界的基础上，而是建立在许多国家拥有这些技术的不稳定因素上，而且缺乏足够的资金来妥善维护和升级：

“

他们认为，发生事故、误判或未经授权的发射的危险，在不像诸如美国和苏联这些拥有相对完善的核安全技术的相对缺乏的国家在多年发展起来的核技术的安全问题上越来越尖锐。像朝鲜这样的流氓国家（可能很快伊朗也会加入）装备着核武器，这会助长恐怖分子的野心，即偷窃、购买或建造核装置。^[4]

”

——《经济学人》，2011年6月16日

据《经济学人》报导，“欧洲高级政治家和妇女”组织呼吁在2010年采取进一步行动解决核扩散问题。他们说：“核威慑对潜在的区域核军备竞赛和核恐怖主义的世界的战略反应远没有冷战时那么有说服力”。^[5]

参考资料

^ Brodie, Bernard, 8, "The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press: 264–304, 1959
^ ^2.0 ^2.1 Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonableness to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero. Schelling, T. C., 2, The Diplomacy of Violence, New Haven: Yale University Press: 1–34, 1966
^ Zagare, Frank C., Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory, Journal of Theoretical Politics 16 (2), 2004, 16 (2): 107–141, doi:10.1177/0951629804041117
^ ^4.0 ^4.1 Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero. The Economist. June 16, 2011 [2018-05-17]. （原始内容存档于2018-04-27）.
^ Kåre Willoch, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Ruud Lubbers, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Guy Verhofstadt; et al. Nuclear progress, but dangers ahead. The Guardian. 14 April 2010 [2018-05-17]. （原始内容存档于2018-08-19）.

U.S. Department of Defense's Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept. [2011-10-11]. （原始内容 (Word)存档于2012-01-18）.

扩展阅读

存在舰队
核讹诈
Schultz, George P. and Goodby, James E. The War that Must Never be Fought, Hoover Press, ISBN 978-0-8179-1845-3, 2015.
Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence. New York: Polity Press.
Jervis, Robert, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp.
Morgan, Patrick. 2003. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press.
T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy In the Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009) ISBN 978-0-226-65002-9.
Garcia Covarrubias, Jaime. "The Significance of Conventional Deterrence in Latin America", March–April 2004.
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities". The American Political Science Review. Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), pp. 731–746.

外部链接

Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Nuclear Deterrence Myth, streaming video of a lecture by Professor John Vasquez, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois, September 17, 2009.
Deterrence Today – Roles, Challenges, and Responses, analysis by Lewis A. Dunn, IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007
Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory by Donald C. Whitmore – March 1, 1998
Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability by David Krieger, April 2001
Bibliography （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）
Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century by the Senate Republican Policy Committee
Nuclear Files.org （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Description and analysis of the nuclear deterrence theory
Nuclear Files.org （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Speech by US General Lee Butler in 1998 on the Risks of Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear Files.org （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） Speech by Sir Joseph Rotblat, Nobel Peace Laureate, on the Ethical Dimensions of Deterrence
The Universal Formula for Successful Deterrence （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） by Charles Sutherland, 2007. A predictive tool for deterrence strategies.
Will the Eagle strangle the Dragon?, Analysis of how the Chinese nuclear deterrence is altered by the U.S. BMD system, Trends East Asia, No. 20, February 2008.
When is Deterrence Necessary? Gauging Adversary Intent （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆） by Gary Schaub,Jr., Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, 4 (Winter 2009) （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）
The significance of conventional deterrence in Latin America（页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）

[Brodie_1959-1] Brodie, Bernard, 8, "The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press: 264–304, 1959

[Schelling_1966-2] 2.0 ^2.1 Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonableness to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero. Schelling, T. C., 2, The Diplomacy of Violence, New Haven: Yale University Press: 1–34, 1966

[Zagare_2004-3] Zagare, Frank C., Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory, Journal of Theoretical Politics 16 (2), 2004, 16 (2): 107–141, doi:10.1177/0951629804041117

[globalzero-4] 4.0 ^4.1 Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero. The Economist. June 16, 2011 [2018-05-17]. （原始内容存档于2018-04-27）.

[Willoch_et_al-5] Kåre Willoch, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Ruud Lubbers, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Guy Verhofstadt; et al. Nuclear progress, but dangers ahead. The Guardian. 14 April 2010 [2018-05-17]. （原始内容存档于2018-08-19）.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]